(a)
The following systems of records are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c) (3) and (4), (d), (e) (1), (2) and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e) (5) and (8), (f), and (g):
(1)
Citizen Complaint Files (JUSTICE/USA-003).
(2)
Civil Case Files (JUSTICE/USA-005).
(3)
Consumer Complaints (JUSTICE/USA-006).
(4)
Criminal Case Files (JUSTICE/USA-007).
(5)
Kline-District of Columbia and Maryland-Stock and Land Fraud Interrelationship Filing System (JUSTICE/USA-009).
(6)
Major Crimes Division Investigative Files (JUSTICE/USA-010).
(7)
Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS) (JUSTICE/USA-011).
(8)
United States Attorney, District of Columbia Superior Court Division, Criminal Files (JUSTICE/USA-013).
(9)
Pre-trial Diversion Program Files (JUSTICE/USA-014).
These exemptions apply to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption pursuant to U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2).
(b)
Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
(1)
From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting, for disclosures pursuant to the routine uses published for these systems, would permit the subject of a criminal investigation and/or civil case or matter under investigation, litigation, regulatory or administrative review or action, to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation, case or matter and present a serious impediment to law enforcement or civil legal activities.
(2)
From subsection (c)(4) since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d), this subsection will not be applicable.
(3)
From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in these systems would inform the subject of criminal investigation and/or civil investigation, matter or case of the existence of that investigation, provide the subject of the investigation with information that might enable him to avoid detection, apprehension or legal obligations, and present a serious impediment to law enforcement and other civil remedies.
(4)
From subsection (e)(1) because in the course of criminal investigations and/or civil investigations, cases or matters, the U.S. Attorneys often obtain information concerning the violation of laws or civil obligations other than those relating to an active case or matter. In the interests of effective law enforcement and civil litigation, it is necessary that the U.S. Attorneys retain this information since it can aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide valuable leads for other agencies and future cases that may be brought within the U.S. Attorneys' offices.
(5)
From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be placed on notice of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection, apprehension or legal obligations and duties.
(6)
From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources of information and endanger the life and physical safety of confidential informants.
(7)
From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because these systems of records are exempt from individual access pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act of 1974.
(8)
From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.
(9)
From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the United States Attorneys' ability to issue subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques and procedures.
(10)
From subsection (f) because these systems of records have been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d).
(11)
From subsection (g) because these systems of records are compiled for law enforcement purposes and have been exempted from the access provisions of subsections (d) and (f).
(c)
The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c) (3) and (4), (d), (e) (1), (2) and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e) (5) and (8), (f), and (g):
(1)
Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act Files (JUSTICE/USA-008)
Code of Federal Regulations
These exemptions apply to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to
5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2)
, (k)(1) and (k)(2).
(d)
Because this system contains Department of Justice civil and criminal law enforcement, investigatory records, exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
(1)
From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting would permit the subject of a criminal investigation and/or civil case or matter under investigation, in litigation, or under regulatory or administrative review or action to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation, case or matter, and present a serious impediment to law enforcement or civil legal activities.
(2)
From subsection (c)(4) because an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records), rendering this subsection inapplicable to the extent that this system of records is exempted from subsection (d).
(3)
From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in these systems would inform the subject of a criminal or civil investigation, matter or case of the existence of such, and provide the subject with information that might enable him to avoid detection, apprehension or legal obligations, and present a serious impediment to law enforcement and other civil remedies. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.
(4)
From subsection (e)(1) because in the course of criminal investigations and/or civil investigations, cases or matters, the U.S. Attorneys often obtain information concerning the violation of laws or civil obligations other than those relating to an active case or matter. In the interests of effective law enforcement and civil litigation, it is necessary that the U.S. Attorneys retain this information since it can aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide valuable leads for other agencies and future cases that may be brought within the U.S. Attorneys' offices.
(5)
From subsection (e)(2) because to collect information to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual of a criminal investigation or prosecution would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be placed on notice of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection, apprehension, or legal obligations and duties.
(6)
From subsection (e)(3) because to provide individuals supplying information with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources of information, and endanger the life and physical safety of confidential informants.
(7)
From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because this system of records is exempt from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) and the rules provisions of subsection (f).
(8)
From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would inhibit the ability of trained investigator and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.
(9)
From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the U.S. Attorneys' ability to issue subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques and procedures.
(10)
From subsection (f) because this system has been exempted from the individual access provisions of subsection (d).
(11)
From subsection (g) because the records in this system are generally compiled for law enforcement purposes and are exempt from the access provisions of subsections (d) and (f), rendering subsection (g) inapplicable.
(1)
Assistant U.S. Attorneys Applicant Records System (JUSTICE/USA-016).
(2)
Appointed Assistant U.S. Attorneys Personnel System (JUSTICE/USA-017).
Code of Federal Regulations
These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption pursuant to
5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5)
.
(f)
Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
(1)
From subsection (d)(1) because many persons are contacted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning a candidate for an Assistant U.S. Attorney position. Access could reveal the identity of the source of the information and constitute a breach of the promise of confidentiality on the part of the Department of Justice. Such breaches ultimately would restrict the free flow of information vital to a determination of a candidate's qualifications and suitability.
(2)
From subsection (e)(1) because in the collection of information for investigative and evaluative purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what exact information may be of assistance in determining the qualifications and suitability of a candidate. Information which may appear irrelevant, when combined with other seemingly irrelevant information, can on occasion provide a composite picture of a candidate for a position which assists in determining whether that candidate should be nominated for appointment.
(g)
The Giglio Impeachment Files (JUSTICE/USA-018) system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a subsections (c)(4), (e)(2), (e)(5), and (g) of the Privacy Act, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), and exempt from subsections (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G) and (H), and (f), pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2). These exemptions apply to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2).
(h)
Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
(1)
From subsection (c)(3); because an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d), this subsection will not be applicable.
(2)
From subsection (c)(4); because an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d), this subsection will not be applicable.
(3)
From subsection (d); because access to the records contained in these systems is not necessary or may impede an ongoing investigation. Most information in the records is derivative from the subject's employing agency files, and individual access will be through the employing agency's files. Additionally, other information in the records may be related to allegations against an agent or witness that are currently being investigated. Providing access to this information would impede the ongoing investigation.
(4)
From subsection (e)(1); because in the interest of effective law enforcement and criminal prosecution, Giglio records will be retained because they could later be relevant in a different case; however, this relevance cannot be determined in advance.
(5)
From subsection (e)(2); because the nature of the records in this system, which are used to impeach or demonstrate bias of a witness, requires that the information be collected from others.
(6)
From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H); because this system of records is exempt from individual access pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act of 1974.
(7)
From subsection (e)(5); because the information in these records is not being used to make a determination about the subject of the records. According to constitutional principles of fairness articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Giglio, the records are required to be disclosed to criminal defendants to ensure fairness of criminal proceedings.
(8)
From subsection (f); because records in this system have been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d).
(9)
From subsection (g); because records in this system are compiled for law enforcement purposes and have been exempted from the access provisions of subsections (d) and (f).
(i)
Consistent with the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974, the Executive Office for United States Attorneys will grant access to nonexempt material in records which are maintained by the U.S. Attorneys. Disclosure will be governed by the Department's Privacy regulations, but will be limited to the extent that the identity of confidential sources will not be compromised; subjects of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil or regulatory violation will not be alerted to the investigation; the physical safety of witnesses, informants and law enforcement personnel will not be endangered, the privacy of third parties will not be violated; and that the disclosure would not otherwise impede effective law enforcement. Whenever possible, information of the above nature will be deleted from the requested documents and the balance made available. The controlling principle behind this limited access is to allow disclosures except those indicated above. The decisions to release information from these systems will be made on a case-by-case basis.
Code of Federal Regulations
[Order No. 645-76, 41 FR 12640, Mar. 26, 1976, as amended by Order No. 716-77, 42 FR 23506, May 9, 1977; Order No. 738-77, 42 FR 38177, July 27, 1977; Order No. 6-86, 51 FR 15476, Apr. 24, 1986; Order No. 57-91, 56 FR 58306, Nov. 19, 1991; Order No. 224-2001, 66 FR 17809, Apr. 4, 2001]